This paper takes an economic approach to derive an evolutionary learning model based entirely on the endogenous use of genetic operators in the employment of self-interested autonomous agents. Reproductive decisions depend on subjective tradeoffs between the quality and quantity of offspring. This avoids the imposition of an external fitness function typically used by genetic algorithms in favor of evolving, heterogeneous preferences over risky reproductive outcomes, expressed via optimal reaction functions. An application to learning in a repeated Cournot oligopoly game is developed, with analytical predictions tested against a computational simulation. With evolutionary coordination via intergenerational wealth transfers, risk-averse firms learn to cooperate to Cournot-Nash market equilibria, raising the market price above costs to fund riskspreading reproductive strategies.
INTRODUCTION
The Genetic Algorithm (GA) has been a popular tool for evolutionary optimization since its development by Holland [7] , successfully applied across a wide range of fields. The idea is simple-evolve a population of solutions to some problem the same way an agriculturalist might improve a strain of corn or breeder might refine a line of dogs. The basic mechanics are simple as well. The GA usually consists of genetic operatorsmutation to introduce new variation and cross-over to recombine existing variation-with selection algorithms that determine how this variation is propagated across successive generations. Under selection, heritability is non-random such that some variants tend to increase in prevalence in the population at the expense of others. Over time, the composition of the population changes in the direction favored by selection.
Selection comprises two separate processes. Some members of the population are chosen for reproduction (the remainders are thus selected out), and then these breeders are often matched in pairs for sexual recombination. The GA is analogous to artificial selection in that the decisions regarding with whom to mate and how many offspring to produce are made exogenously to meet external criteria. In contrast, evolution via natural selection proceeds from endogenous mate choice and breeding decisions made by heterogeneous individuals, with reproductive behavior itself subject to evolutionary optimization. This paper takes a fundamentally economic approach to the evolutionary problem. Miller [11] first applied the GA to economics, where it has been used in numerous models of learning and adaptation. Economics has also provided a platform to study the performance of the GA. But economics can also provide a framework for a different treatment of selection, implicit fitness based on the interaction of subjective preferences and beliefs under density-dependent competition.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, some key conceptual differences between endogenous and exogenous approaches reproduction and fitness are outlined, highlighting some limitations of the traditional GA. A more dynamic, flexible picture of evolutionary optimization is proposed. Then, an analytical model is developed from which fitness emerges as the implicit result of optimization of individual decisions using reproduction for risk management. An application to densitydependent competition in a Cournot oligopoly game is developed both analytically and in a multi-agent social simulation. A steadystate is derived from density dependence, testing theoretical predictions against the simulation results. Finally, the paper concludes with a brief discussion of ongoing and future work.
FITNESS AND UTILITY 2.1 Ex Ante or Ex Post?
The artificial selection approach taken by the GA requires a speculative ranking of all members of the population, so that relative representation in the next generation can be parceled out proportionally. Ranks are assigned exogenously by a so-called "fitness function," the definition and evaluation of which is often problematic. Thus "fitness" determines reproduction ex ante.
By contrast, in evolution via natural and sexual selection, endogenous mate choice and offspring investment decisions mean fitness results from the varying competitive ability of agents to acquire resources and use them to produce competitive offspring. Tradeoffs abound. Successful reproduction determines fitness, properly measured as the geometric mean growth rate ( r ) of a lineage [15] , only observable ex post.
The ex ante subjective estimation of the value of different outcomes is more properly named utility. The traditional GA's ranking function will henceforth be referred to as an external or exogenous utility function. There is no fitness function. The geometric mean growth rate of measured in multi-agent simulations can be compared to theoretical predictions, but by itself r is merely a statistic collected after the fact.
Density Dependence
The spatial metaphor commonly depicted for the GA is Sewall Wright's "fitness landscape" [20] . Imagine rolling hills where distances are measured in some genotypic or phenotypic space, elevations capturing cardinal utility preferences levels. Thus social learning as a hill-climbing algorithm, where bottomdwellers are replaced by higher-altitude imitators of the "fitter," pulling the population up over time.
A more dynamic model treats fitness as earned evolutionary profit. A positive net evolutionary growth rate ( 0 r > ) increases competition, either by feeding higher-quality competitors or increased population growth. Evolutionary equilibrium is defined by a zero-profit rule: no net population growth, 0 r = , as a long run steady-state about which individual lineages struggle. Spatially, a hill of positive fitness represents a growing population. But the hill erodes away as competition checks growth rates, and in a population crisis may even turn into a sink of net population loss. Evolution never stands still so long as competition continues. The long run average density-dependent "fitness landscape" is merely a flat plane at zero altitude.
Heterogeneous Preferences
The GA's external utility function imposes the same preferences upon every individual in the population. Homogeneity is required to generate a consistent ordered ranking of all individuals, a prerequisite for the application of common selection mechanisms. Roulette-wheel selection takes utility cardinally, assigning a probability for reproduction proportionally over the relative strength of the preference rankings. Tournament selection, on the other hand, makes use of an ordinal utility function, sampling individuals for binary rank comparisons. By specifying a shared utility function of any form, the GA provides a shared set of values. Without such conformity, no games of "how fitter?" or even "who's fitter?" can be played. This is the major advantage of exogenous utility, but it comes with a price.
Homogeneous preferences lead to brittle, homomorphic solutions-premature convergence to local optima, the inevitable result of any process of learning by imitation [16] . Reduced genetic and phenotypic diversity results from the selection algorithm itself. In some pure optimization applications this may be a minor or readily mitigated issue, but not in multi-agent systems where the emergence of diverse behavior is of interest, particularly in complex, open-ended models of social interaction.
Freeing the utility function from the role of ranking the population allows it to represent individually subjective preferences over both economic and reproductive outcomes.
A MODEL OF ENDOGENOUS FITNESS 3.1 Evolutionary Optimization
The economic approach to evolutionary optimization was pioneered by Gary Becker, whose work on the demand for children is the basis of the model developed here. Gandolfi et al. [6] offer an easy-to-follow review of Becker's work in this area, synthesizing an economic vision of evolutionary optimization across many different arenas of reproductive and social behavior. This approach is also informed by Hillard Kaplan's application of economics to life history theory, with parental investment in the form of embodied capital [10] .
Optimization is about tradeoffs. While models of the tradeoff between the quality and quantity of offspring are nothing new, in economics [4] or biology [14] , to this author's knowledge this is the first time they've served as the foundation for a model of evolutionary learning in a social environment. Here the tradeoff is between returns to parental investment and mortality risks.
The Problem
The evolutionary objective can be defined as follows. Instead of being directly concerned with their own wealth or health, parents maximize some subjective expected utility (EU) of offspring over different reproductive outcomes: The choice variables are the quantity n of raised and the quality q of each, chosen to maximize subjective value over a probability distribution with each outcome characterized by a possible net reproductive rate
n -how many actually survive to reproduce given the distribution of mortality risks. The probability mass function pmf() specifies the likelihood of each survivorship outcome R, dependent on the total number of offspring and an assumed independent mortality risk [0,1] ∈ z which may in turn depend on parental investment 0 ≥ q . The value of each successful reproductive effort depends on the subjective expected utility of offspring given some function of returns to parental investment, ( ) 0 π ≥ q , over its own probability distribution. If an individual's subjective optimization problem generates adaptive behavior, it will tend to correlate positively with the geometric mean rate of increase, r-ex post evolutionary fitness.
The problem is constrained by the reproductive budget Π : (2) ( )
where Π comes from monetary or energetic profits from economic or ecological activity initially funded by the reproducing agent's own endowment of embodied capital. Some fixed cost C and an constant marginal cost c determine how many offspring of a given quality a parent can afford.
Dynamic optimization is avoided by assuming one-period generations with a single reproductive "litter" of symmetric offspring. Before proceeding with the static problem, some additional simplifying assumptions are made for analytical ease. While numerical solutions may sometimes suffice, in this initial examination analytical verifiability will be important. First, make the standard biological assumption that the marginal value of offspring is constant, ( , ( )) ( ( )) π π = ⋅ EU R q R EU q , so that utility scales linearly with the number of symmetric surviving offspring R . Second, assume subjective certainty about the payoff to parental investment, such that ( ( )) ( ( )) π π = EU q U q , ignoring the distribution of rewards and avoiding nonlinearities over additively separable economic outcomes. Together, these two simplifications apply subjective risk preferences solely over the mean return to parental investment, which reduces generality but will make an analytical solution feasible with additional assumptions. The utility of symmetric offspring is equal and independent of the number of survivors, allowing us to pull this scale factor from the cumulative density function. This yields an extremely useful simplification-only the expected value of the offspring outcome distribution matters, which is well known for the resulting binomial survivorship distribution from n independent trials at success probability 1 − z :
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Finally, assume that mortality risk is independent and identical across identical offspring and completely exogenous, ( ) = z q z . The simplified problem can be expressed with the Lagrangian:
, , ; , , 1
Inequality constraints on n and q can be considered step-by-step with the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, but note that the * 0 = n corner solution occurs when the parent cannot afford one offspring of even minimal 0 =uality given the fixed and marginal costs of reproduction. Otherwise, the budget constraint binds to at least a single offspring at suboptimal quality. Let (0) 0
The first-order necessary conditions for maximization follow:
Simultaneously solving equations (5) and (6) allows derivation of a single equation that must hold for optimal parental investment:
Notice this depends only on the subjective return to capital and the marginal cost of each offspring. The form of the utility function and expected returns function must be known or assumed to complete the analytical solution. Critically, reproductive behavior does not depend directly on the rate of survivorship; given the many simplifying assumptions made; random death's affect on population dynamics is instead felt indirectly through economic profit Π via competition, and agents have no need to subjectively estimate this risk.
Equation (2) can be rearranged to show that the optimal number of offspring depends on how many of the optimal quality can be afforded within the budget constraint:
Maximizing the sheer number of offspring produced is not an optimal strategy. The tradeoff with quality leads to a reduction in the number of offspring produced to the extent that parents subjectively value the estimated return to offspring capital investments. The optimum occurs when equal marginal utility is expected from investments in both variables.
Heterogeneous Preferences
Evolutionary models typically assume risk-neutral maximization of some measure of net reproductive value. Extensive analytical tractability can often be achieved from the use of a linear functional form, and in many cases the optimal solutions prove invariant to positive monotonic transformation, allowing other conveniences such as taking logs. By assumption, only averages matter. See Charnov [5] for a compact derivation of such a linear evolutionary life-history model inspired by the economic approach. Linear evolutionary models implicitly assume that natural selection will favor expected-value maximizers over riskaverse utility maximizers. As a result, risk preferences are usually ignored by evolutionary models.
In some problems, including the quality/quantity tradeoff model sketched out above, nonlinear risk preferences do change the subjectively optimal behavior. The optimal amount of parental investment per offspring in Equation (7) depends on risk preferences over child economic outcomes. A central assumption of Becker's approach has been stable and homogenous preferences across individuals [16] . Since the subjective value of reproduction comes from risk-spreading, this model instead lets preferences freely evolve, emphasizes the potential for heterogeneous risk-management strategies. The dependence of the optimal quality and thus number of offspring on inherited preferences allows the objective function itself to evolve over time. Behavior arises from the interaction of personal preferences and private information in pursuit of self-interested goals. Performance over economic or ecological outcomes is ultimately measured in resultant reproductive success. These linkages are captured in the evolvable reaction functions of Equations (7) and (8)-the theory is ready for testing.
COURNOT OLIGOPOLY GAME 4.1 Background
Consider a simple Cournot competition model, one of the oldest and best-studied problems in game theory. Competing firms produce an identical good for sale in the face of some unknown demand, taking the market price as given. Firms compete through the quantity of output produced. Returns to production are density-dependent, the price a decreasing function of the total quantity supplied. A finite population size gives firms market power-the ability to move the price with their output decisions. Firms simultaneously and individually decide how much to produce. Raise the market price by producing less, but those who don't restrict their output profit more at the higher price. Alternatively, producing more than other firms lowers the market price, reducing profits but hurting the over-producer most. Either way, defecting from the Walrasian zero-profit equilibrium makes a firm relatively worse off than others. On the other hand, there exists a profitable Cournot-Nash equilibrium if all firms learn to cooperate and simultaneously reduce collective output. The question is, how can firms learn to exploit such profits?
The strategic element of this problem has made it a favorite of economists studying competition and learning for well over a century. With the modern tools of multi-agent simulation, the dynamics of this and other coordination games can be examined in new ways, with Cournot oligopoly a frequent test subject of evolutionary learning algorithms. Such results have shown that reaching the cooperative equilibrium depends on subtleties of the learning algorithm. Vriend [18] used the GA in two ways: as it's typically treated as social learning with each firm a single rule in a population, and second by giving each firm an independent population of rules and its own GA to select among competing beliefs-a hierarchy devised by Holland [9] called a Learning Classifier System (LCS). The single-rule firms, directly competing with each other in both the economic game and GA, quickly learn to defect to the Walrasian zero-profit local optimum. In the LCS, the composition of the multi-ruled firms evolves independently of rules in other firms, individual learning able to reach the profitable Cournot-Nash cooperative outcome.
In both cases, the GA was functionally identical, using wealth as fitness with a fixed number of firms. The difference is in how feedback from economic competition interacts with the evolutionary learning algorithm. Those closest to the Walrasian outcome improve their relative fitness ranking, even if their absolute fitness falls, the so-called "spite effect" [18] , the GA converging on the zero-profit local optima. Untethering the reproduction of competing individual rules from economic competition shields from the social punishment of a ranked fitness system. Riechmann's [13] comparative study of evolutionary learning methods showed that reaching a Cournot-Nash equilibrium depends on informational requirements, the ability to store memories, and the computational and rationality challenges of processing it all. The traditional GA fails on all counts. See [1] and [2] for other examples of evolutionary learning to this problem.
Investment and Quantity Competition
Firms in the Cournot model compete on quantity. The embodied capital provided via parental investment takes the form of a capacity constraint on a firm's output. Production is free up to this point, a sunk cost already paid by parental investment. Because profits are proportional to individual output, incentives ensure production satiates the endowed capacity constraint.
The structure of the problem is chosen carefully to highlight the role of subjective risk aversion. Assume the marginal cost of offspring production capacity is constant, units chosen to normalize it to one. Parental investment occurs at constant returns, leaving risk preferences over quality as the only source of nonlinearity. Thus a positive marginal cost to reproduction requires that firms give up expected profits with each additional offspring, regardless of risk:
Relatively risk-neutral expected-value maximizers will choose the corner solution, 1 = n , while risk-averse utility maximizers will use profits to diversify, 1 > n , diminishing returns entirely due to a subjective aversion to risking all investment in the same basket.
Density-Dependent Steady State
Consider the density-dependent steady state where the total revenue from the market approaches the expected risk-discounted capacity supplied by parents in the previous generation:
This reduces to:
with the steady-state price entirely determined by the risk to embodied capital. Firms earn one unit of risk-adjusted profit for each unit invested by parents into their endowments. In turn, positive economic profits are invested into the production capacity of the next generation, with zero net evolutionary profits:
At the steady state, each unit of capital earns just enough on average to pay for reproduction at the replacement rate. A positive-profit market equilibrium exists within the constraints of the zero-growth evolutionarily long run.
In contrast, the risk-neutral competitive equilibrium converges toward a price equal to the marginal cost of output, the economic Walrasian equilibrium:
At this price costly reproduction is unaffordable, such that this equilibrium reaches 0 = r the hard way-extinction.
COMPUTATIONAL EXAMPLE 5.1 Method
A simple computational implementation of the above evolutionary economic model was developed to test the feasibility and stability of the risk-averse evolutionary steady-state. The operation of the simulation is simple. Each generation, each firm produces a quantity of output to sell in a competitive Cournot market. Production is determined by capacity constraints funded by parental investment. The total market supply is added up and equated with the static demand schedule. The nonnegative price which clears the market is quoted and trades take place, revenue parceled out proportionally to each firm's output.
Firms then take stock of their earnings and make reproductive decisions using their evolved reaction functions. Essentially, they hire genetic operators to create offspring to their own quality specifications. These investments are subject to risk as offspring face some probability of failure, capital endowments lost, while survivors repeat the cycle. Those who cannot afford the costs of reproducing forfeit representation in the next generation.
The evolution of the system is determined by the actual mechanisms for forming beliefs and expressing heritable preferences. These details are fleshed out below.
Beliefs
The structure and complexity of subjective beliefs plays a critical role in the learning method employed. To determine the optimal investment in offspring, an agent needs some way to evaluate the productivity of such investments, ( ) * π q . In the Cournot market, with a common market-clearing price P dependent on total production Q , firm profits are paid as: (14) ( ) ( )
where 0 q is the capacity constraint chosen by the active firm's parent. Suppose that firms just take a linear extrapolation from the markup they received when producing in order to estimate the productivity of parental investment across all q , assuming the market price is independent of their quality choice.
The expected marginal profit of investment in offspring capacity constraints is just the average return the parent received on its own endowment. This simple model of adaptive expectations provides a very myopic short-run subjective view of the Cournot market, but it will prove sufficient in the endogenous fitness model. All it requires of firms is the ability to remember the size of their own capacity constraints.
Heterogeneous Preferences
Preferences serve to evaluate private beliefs about the state of the world. As first proved by von Neumann and Morgenstern [17] , a nonlinear utility function can be used to represent preference rankings given certain assumptions about the rationality of decision-making behavior. More complex methods of capturing preference relations can reproduce some of the regular irrationality revealed by behavioral experiments, for example Pin's [12] application of the GA to evolve rankings over simple three-state lotteries in a Machina triangle, but the simplicity and analytical possibilities offered by utility functions make them an obvious first choice. The contrast with the traditional GA is in how utility functions are used.
A functional form will be assumed that can be programmed easily in the computational model and used to analytically predict equilibria to compare with empirical results. Specify utility over outcomes with a three-parameter power function:
0,1 , 100,100 , 0,1 . 
Note that 1 α = implies risk neutrality, 0 = RRA , while the power
risk proclivity ( 0 < RRA ) depending on the offset parameter b and relative wealth. As b moves from the positive through zero to negative numbers, relative risk aversion shifts from decreasing to constant to increasing with wealth. Arrow [1] hypothesized increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA), and 0 b < makes intuitive sense, providing a minimal quality for positive utility, b k , below which preferences are risk-seeking with no demand for reproduction, while above this threshold preferences become risk-averse and reproduction enters as a viable strategy. The computational model will test Arrow's prediction.
A firm's preferences are represented simply by a set of three realvalued numbers in [ ) 0,1 appropriately scaled to the bounds reported in Equation (16) . These preferences are heritable, subject to a small probability of point mutation during reproduction, in which case a new preference parameter is randomly generated from a uniform distribution. This ensures that the entire parameter space can be easily explored to avoid purely local optima.
The form in Equation (16) is convenient because of the scaling behavior of successive derivatives. Plugging in the simple adaptive expectations belief formation rule from Equation (15), optimal parental investment simplifies to: (18) ( )
This depends on three preference parameters, the adaptive expectation of beliefs, and the marginal cost of offspring. The optimal number of kids is a slightly messier reaction function: (19) ( )
Note that the reaction functions are only defined for risk-neutral preferences. Since reproduction provides subjective value only through the diversification of risk, this is not surprising, but the endogenous fitness approach here rejects the notion that evolution must favor expected value maximizers.
Difficulties
How sophisticated must be the decision-making apparatus? Riechmann [13] found that all models that successfully converge on the Cournot-Nash equilibrium required computational complexity equivalent to maximization. In the endogenous fitness approach, given the optimization model above, maximization is implicit even when only using the derived reaction functions. One additional complexity is in the handling of non-integer optimal litter sizes. Simple hacks such as rounding or truncating decimals applies differential and unpredictable harm to firms. A better approach would be to use the subjective expected utility function itself in a direct comparison of the two nearest integer outcomes. This is the method taken in the numerical simulation reported here. In cases where the reaction functions are not solvable and the search space small, the expected utility function can be similarly used to rank and search the entire set of likely outcomes.
Riechmann's results suggest that knowledge of aggregate demand is a necessary condition for Cournot-Nash outcomes, information that the implicit fitness maximizers lack. The simple model sketched above seems ill-equipped to learning one's influence on demand. In the endogenous fitness model however, coordination not with other competitors in the current population but with one's parents and own offspring will be key to achieving coordinated profits without such global knowledge. The computational model will test this hypothesis.
Setting Parameters
Simulation parameters are listed in Table 1 . Suppose demand is a power law relationship, with parameters chosen such that price is a decreasing function of total market quantity Q :
This facilitates easy calculations of total and marginal revenues. Parameters are chosen so that, following Equation (12), the price is high enough to fund replacement-level reproduction at large market quantities capable of supporting a population of firms given assumptions about costs. Production is free to individuals as output was already bought with parental investment at a constant cost of one unit of wealth per unit of offspring capacity.
Reproductive costs consist of fixed and constant marginal costs. While Cournot implementations often provide a subsidy with a negative fixed cost, instead 0 > C here provides a threshold level of income firms must meet each generation to remain in the game. A positive marginal cost, 0 > c , produces the model's essential tradeoff between net offspring value and risk diversificationassumed constant for simplicity. The exogenous mortality risk
is also essential for reproduction to be a viable risk management strategy. This is set to the least-risky environment with integer interior steady-state solution, The pointwise mutation rate μ is set low so persistent variation must be maintained by the selection algorithm rather than a rapid introduction of mutants. With only three mutable preference parameters, the value in Table 1 leads to an expectation of one mutation per generation with a population size of about 333. To initialize the model, 0 N firms with the same capacity constraint are generated, each with random preferences.
Analytical Predictions
The density-dependent steady state conditions as given in Equation (12) predict the total market quantity per generation:
Using the parameters in Table 1 , the long-run average market price should be ( ) . Positive economic profits from the risk-averse restriction of output pay for replacement-level reproduction-zero evolutionary profit with a long-run growth rate of 0 = r . As a benchmark for non-steadystate behavior, the Cournot-Nash positive-profit outcome is:
where <
CN SS
Q Q if individual firms learn to exploit their market power to increase profits given the best risk-averse response of the other firms. While this can lead to 0 > r in the short run, long-run competition should ultimately check growth.
Due to the marginal cost of reproduction, the return to concentrating parental investment objectively outweighs the risk. Only subjective risk aversion keeps firms from defecting by decreasing their gross reproductive rate to 1 = n , raising short-run profits relative to others. The traditional GA's exogenous utility function actually rewards defectors, with the risk-neutral perfectly-competitive Walrasian outcome given by: that can only be sustained by subsidies to production or reproduction. Without subsidies, extinction should be characterized by a depression in price and increase in quantity toward these limits.
Computational Results
Computation experiments are still at an early stage, but initial results can be described. One hundred runs with the above parameterization were conducted up to a maximum of 50,000 generations, as well as forty runs capped at one million generations. Only 2/140 runs died out before 50,000 generations, with 9/40 dead before the one million mark, but all instances flirted with endogenous extinction. This process will be discussed more below. The long-run dynamic character of behavior is wellestablished by 50,000 generations, so this generation is taken as 138 random samples of the model's long-run behavior. The average price at the 50,000 th generation is 2.04 = P , with 376,271 = Q . The populations that achieve this long-run average are quite variable in size and character, both within and across runs. The average of 138 50,000 th generations is about 256 firms, with a standard deviation of about 115.
The distribution of firms is heterogeneous as well. This can be measured with the Herfindahl index, the sum of squared market shares as a measure of industry concentration. For symmetric equilibrium, the Herfindahl index should be equal to the inverse of the number of firms, in this case an average of 1 256 0.39% ≈ , while the average across sample runs is twice as high, 0.78% , indicating an unequal but still highly competitive distributionthe frequent presence of multiple strategies close to 0 = r .
It's easier to get a sense of the dynamic nature of competition around the long-run steady state by looking at individual runs across time. Figure 1 presents a randomly chosen instance in several variables over 50,000 generations. Table 1 parameter specification.
Figure 1. Sample run with the
Generation-to-generation prices and population sizes are very noisy, patterns clearer when shown in logarithmic scale. Much of this variance is likely explained by the high stochastic mortality risk and suboptimal outcomes due to the integer constraint on n . Several brushes with extinction are evident where industry concentration as measured by the Herfindahl index spikes above the long-run average of 0.83%; in one case a single risk-neutral firm amassed nearly half of the system's wealth after a mutated ancestor defected from the risk-averse equilibrium. This coincides with a depression in the price as the system tilts toward the riskneutral Walrasian outcome at 1 ≡ P . In each case, the would-be monopolist's risky position eventually comes calling, exogenous mortality striking after a lucky streak of a dozen generations or more. The price immediately spikes upward in the vacuum of such large capital losses, funding a quick recovery to resume fluctuating around a risk-averse equilibrium at 2 ≈ P . As seen with the sample runs that died out, populations don't always recover from these defections. Larger average population sizes from lower costs or larger demand reduce this risk.
DISCUSSION
How do the computational results support or refute the various predictions made in laying out the model? Preferences can be characterized by looking at average relative risk aversion in "juvenile" and "adult" firms, before and after selling output in the Cournot market. Evolved risk preferences tend to exhibit increasing relative risk aversion (IRRA) as Arrow [1] predicted. Dropping one outlier where a single high-quality offspring was flipped to extreme DRRA by mutation, the average degree of relative risk aversion in 137 samples rose from -20.47, riskseeking at the level of initial endowments, to +36.27 and riskaversion after earning economic profits, adults eager to reproduce.
Risk-averse preferences and intergenerational capacity constraints induce firms to withhold enough production to raise the market price significantly above the marginal unit cost of output. But do firms do so in a Walrasian or Cournot-Nash manner? Does the markup simply cover the subjective risk premiums, or do firms learn to exploit their market power for even greater short-run profits? The first clue is that the cross-sectional average growth rate is 13.5% = $ r at the 50,000 th generation, significantly above the long-run 0 = r steady-state. Similar results occur with later generations in the smaller million-generation sample. Generational population growth and evolutionary profits are on average positive. This suggests most generations achieve learned Cournot-Nash outcomes, punctuated by steeper population declines from price-depression fueled by the cumulated profits.
This hypothesis can be tested by comparing the sample outcomes to the predicted Walrasian and Cournot-Nash equilibria. At the average of 256 firms, the sample average of 376,271 is closer to ≈ CN Q 377,542 than the predicted zero-profit ≈ SS Q 379,023. The average sample price of 2.04 and price at the average quantity 2.022 are closer to the Cournot-Nash price of 2.012 than the steady state price of 2. These differences are small with many firms, so finer-grained tests were conducted by calculating the sum of squared residuals between the actual and the predicted Walrasian and Cournot-Nash quantities for the number of firms. Both across the 50k generation sample and within every single individual run, the Cournot-Nash prediction is closer on average. By contrast, the average terminal generation in the ten extinct runs was closest to the risk-neutral Walrasian outcome, average terminal output of 480,253 units at an average price of 1.43.
With asexual reproduction and near 100% heritability, parents and offspring have strong incentives to cooperate over evolutionary timeframes. Parental precommitments via quantity constraints and shared risk aversion allow lineages to overcome the time inconsistency problems of myopic short-run expectations, restricting output below the risk-neutral Walrasian equilibrium to earn positive economic profits. In most generations, firms appear to have evolved to exploit their own market power and earn even greater short-run profits by learning to reduce output even further, with average behavior closer to Cournot-Nash cooperation.
Under endogenous fitness, every agent is equipped with its own set of genetic operators at the disposal of subjective reproductive preferences, constrained by the ability to acquire profits from economic or ecological competition. The quality and quantity of offspring is endogenously determined by the firm itself, reflecting the subjective value reproduction yields from decreased exposure to evolutionary risk. Selection is natural in that agents who cannot compete and lineages that fail to spread are automatically removed from the population over time. The genes of different agents are not in direct competition as in a traditional GA; instead they compete indirectly through their effects on behavior. The result is an individual evolutionary learning algorithm that stands apart from existing methods. Contrary to common beliefs, subjective risk aversion is a viable evolutionarily-stable strategy.
CONCLUSION
A large number of hacks have been developed over the decades to deal with the problems of the GA, reducing replicability making parameter tuning more of an art than a science. Implicit fitness supports more flexible, heterogeneous, and complex outcomes, advantageous in any model where these features are valued. Situations where "fitness" is difficult to define or calculate, where multiple strategies may coexist, or where outcomes are openended have much to gain from an implicit approach, especially multi-agent social simulations. Other mechanisms for endogenizing fitness have been developed. For example, Holland's Echo system [8] and those inspired by it require agents to collect numerous diverse resources to construct copies of themselves. More biologically realistic, perhaps, but this requires a great deal of low-level complexity even in models focused on higher-order behavior. Subjective preferences represented by individual utility functions achieve many of the same goals with much greater economy, requiring only one continuously-valued resource, measured in money, calories, or whatever.
One obvious application for this approach is learning classifier systems, where traditional wealth-based ranking has been largely abandoned due to homogeneity problems. Instead predictive accuracy is often used as a fitness measure to support heterogeneous populations of agents in different niches [19] . Experiments are currently underway with risk-sensitive classifiers. Risk-averse economic strategies for buying and selling information in a stochastic market evolve using the same basic risk preferences that generate reproductive strategies, tightly integrating reproductive and economic decision-making.
As this work is in its preliminary stages, much needs to be done to analytically and experimentally explore the parameter space and flesh out the character of the asymmetric density-dependent equilibria. In addition, many obvious extensions suggest themselves, particularly with regard to sexual reproduction and endogenous evolving mate choice. The options are endless, but with each extension analytical solutions become more difficult. Still, the specification of the reaction functions is simpler than developing good explicit utility functions for complex tasks. And as derivations become intractable, the methodology of directly evolving non-parametric reaction functions rather than deriving structural forms from underlying optimization models may prove fruitful, as well as simply ranking potential outcomes.
The integration of economic and evolutionary approaches to complex dynamic problems has proven very rich over the last several decades, a trend that seems to be growing as multi-agent models with learning and emergent social dynamics are applied to more and more problems. The extension of subjective risk preferences to evolutionary behavior can lead to a large array of implicit fitness models capable evolving in the face of tradeoffs.
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